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OVERVIEW: In the last few decadesone of the most publicized controversies in fundamental physics has 
been the argument between condensed matter theory (CMT) physicists such as P.W. Anderson, Robert 
Laughlinand David Pineson the one hand,and particle physicists such as Steven Weinberg and Leonard 
Susskind on the other over whichtheoretical framework is in the best position to unify physics and lead 
it into the twenty first century. For reasons that will be made clear, CMT has been branded as the 
purveyor of emergence and particle physics considered the champion of reduction in this struggle. This 
battle still rages today in a volley of books and articles such as Laughlin’s <i>A Different Universe: 
Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down</i> (2005) and Susskind’s <i>The Cosmic Landscape: String 
Theory and the Illusion of Intelligent Design</i> (2005). The key events in this fight will be detailed, from 
the publication of P.W Anderson’s classic <i>More is Different article</i> (1972) to the protracted 
debates about whether or not to fund theSuperconducting Super Collider(SSC) andon up to the 
skirmishes of the present day. The historical significance of these machinations can only be fully 
appreciated when it is clear exactly what is at issue philosophically, methodologically and empirically 
between these two warring factions of fundamental physics. Thus by way of conceptual analysis, a 
taxonomy of various critical notions of emergence and reduction will be provided and the combatant’s 
claims properly situated therein. Though as we shall see, this is no easy task as both sides equivocate 
madly in their use of the terms “emergence” and “reduction.”  In addition to raising profound 
ontological questions about the structure of the world such as the true nature of interlevel relations, 
epistemic questions about fundamental scientific explanation and intertheoretic relations, our history 
lesson suggests that theoretical physics (especially quantum gravity) may well be in a revolutionary 
Kuhnian state. We will find that there is fundamental disagreement over what is in fact fundamental and 
disagreement over how, if at all, the physical sciences and the world can be unified.   
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The future of the supercolliderwas at stake: if other branches of physics 
follow logically from “fundamental” laws, then (manyargued) there were principled philosophical and 
practical reasons for funding the SSC. Thus, the alleged autonomy of condensed matter physics from the 
principles of particle physics had been debated from the physics communityall the way to the halls of 
Congress. Condensed matter physicists argued that the non-reductive autonomy of their field spoke 
against funding the SCC in a zero-sum game. Steven Weinberg’s book <i>dreams of a final theory</i> 
was a pleafor “fundamentalism”and constructivist (asopposed to principle theories) metaphysics and a 
case for a multibillion-dollar colliderin Texas. Condensed matter physicists  [such as Anderson in his 
famous 1972 article] asserted the importance of brokensymmetry in understanding real-world 
problems,suggesting an alternative approach to fundamental physics and implying that no single 
“grand” or “constructive” approach could capture the complexity or universality of nature. The physics 
community eventually fractured and the cohesive standard model narrative of the 1960s and 1970s 
began to dissolve. The narrative of fundamental symmetries of the universe as espoused by high-energy 
physicists in the 1960s and 1970s dissolved into a cacophony of competing narratives (strings, broken 
symmetry, condensed matter theory, etc.) that all made their own claims to being elegant and 
fundamental. By the end of the Cold War, particle physicists could not justifythe SCC (although some 
such as Weinberg tried) based on symmetry and fundamental entitiesas they had donein the 1960s, 
because the disunityof the physics community had undermined the plausibility of their storyas the 
gospel. “In the Demise of the SSC can be seen the confrontation of the simple, symmetric realm of 
particle physics with the complexity and contingency of the real world. In the real world, on human 
scales where human problems count, symmetries are broken and condensed matter physics has direct 
relevance. The fragmentation of the physics community over superstrings, SDI, and the SSC in Cold War 
II mirrored this spontaneous breakdown of order; no longer could any one story be told about HEP, no 
longer wasthere space and time for any grand narrative of physics”(Hallam Stevens, 2003, HSPS, p. 153). 
Finally, one key battle in this war was over recruitment. Regardless of the money moving into physics 
through SDI and the SSC, recruitment into HEP was low through the early 1980s. However, by contrast 
Condensed-matter physics and molecular biology were heavily funded.In the late 1980s <i>The 
Scientist</i> wasspeaking about a “civil war” within the physics community. Some condensed matter 
physicists contemplated seceding from the APSto form their own organization. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE HISTORICAL DEBATE: Of most interest to us were the claims of 
P.W. Anderson and other CMT folk that HEP is in no significant way more intellectually profound or 
fundamental than more (relatively speaking) “applied” branches of physics such as CMT. Steven 
Weinberg made many practical arguments for SSC but of special interest to us is his claim that “particle 
physics [QM, QFT, GR and cosmology] is in some sense more fundamental than other areas of physics” 
(2001, p. 12).One interesting thing about the historical battle over the SSC is at bottom it was a 
philosophical disputeabout what is fundamental and what is emergent and indeed, a battle over how to 
define these very terms. Unsurprisingly, both sides were guilty of equivocation and vaguenessall around, 
especially as pertaining to ontological versus methodological disputes. Part of the goal of this paper is to 
disambiguate this mess and disentangle the deeper philosophical issues.This seems like an especially 
useful and timely enterprise in that there are lessons here for current debates over emergence and 
reduction. 
 
